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BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS FOR INSOLVENT
DECEDENTS' ESTATESt
Richard V. Wellman*
Under present law, bankruptcy proceedings cannot be in-
stituted by or against insolvent decedents' estates. Creditors of
insolvent decedents must look to state probate laws for satisfac-
tion. But these laws are more concerned with the control of
solvent estates than with the affairs of the impecunious. Also,
transfers of wealth at death by nonprobate means are coming to
be the rule rather than the exception, and it is frequently very
difficult for creditors of decedents to obtain satisfaction of unse-
cured claims from nonprobate assets. This article advocates the
extension of bankruptcy laws to insolvent decedents' estates and
explores problems and solutions that might be involved if this
recommendation is accepted.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
Existing federal and state laws impact most curiously on the
position of creditors of insolvent decedents. Unless the death of
the debtor occurs after commencement of federal bankruptcy
proceedings, federal courts have indicated that they lacked juris-
diction under the Bankruptcy Act.1 Furthermore, federal deci-
t This article was prepared for the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States. The views expressed are the author's and not necessarily those of the Commission
or its staff. The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Mark B. Hillis, Esq.,
Indianapolis, Indiana (J.D., 1972, University of Michigan), who served as research assis-
tant during the period of preliminary study.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. National Educational Direc-
tor, Joint Editorial Board, Uniform Probate Code. A.B., 1947, J.D., 1949, University of
Michigan.
1 In re Estate of Hiller, 240 F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Cal. 1965) (petition for voluntary
bankruptcy dismissed on the ground that the purposes of bankruptcy do not require the
application of bankruptcy proceedings to decedents' estates); In re Estate of Mulero, 143
F. Supp. 504 (D.P.R. 1956) (decedent's estate is not a "person" entitled to the benefits of
voluntary bankruptcy); In re Morgan, 26 F.2d 90 (D. Mass. 1928) (petition for involuntary
bankruptcy dismissed upon finding that decedent had committed suicide prior to filing of
petition); Nadler, Bankruptcy Courts' Refusal to Assume Jurisdiction over Insolvent
Decedents' Estates: A Rebuttal, 26 FORDHAM L. REV. I, 2-9 (1957). Cf White v.
Cormier, 311 Mass. 537, 540, 42 N.E.2d 256, 258 (1942) (laws of the state govern
settlement of insolvent estates of deceased persons).
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sions establish that routine probate matters are not within the
equity jurisdiction of the federal courts. 2 To many, these autho-
rities appear to block any attempt to use diversity of citizenship
between persons interested in an estate as a basis for proceedings
to marshal assets of a decedent in federal court. However, the
historic probate jurisdiction of English ecclesiastical tribunals was
limited to probate of wills and appointment of administrators;
proceedings to settle insolvent estates were handled elsewhere.
Hence, one may concede that federal courts lack probate jurisdic-
tion but dispute the assumption that keeps them from proceedings
to marshal assets of insolvent estates. 3
On the other hand, if the debtor's death occurs after bank-
ruptcy proceedings have been commenced, there is no abate-
ment. 4 State law rights of his spouse and dependent children to
step ahead of unsecured creditors in relation to property that
would be exempt in the living debtor's hands are respected, but
the estate remains subject to control of the federal court, and the
normal arsenal of weapons continues to be available to the trustee
in bankruptcy. 5
As with most legal phenomena, this improbable arrangement
has not gone unsupported. In 1880, a federal judge wrote:
The two-fold purpose which the bankrupt act has in view,
viz., the equal and just distribution of the bankrupt's estate
among his creditors, and the discharge of the bankrupt from
his debts, does not require the application of the law to the
estate of the deceased person. The law of the states provide
for an equitable and just distribution of the decedent's estate,
and death has already discharged him of all personal liability.
The bankrupt law could, in the case of a deceased person,
accomplish nothing not already accomplished without it.6
His honor did not need to explain why pending bankruptcy
proceedings did not abate upon death of the debtor, because the
federal statute with which he was familiar permitted abatement. 7
His assessment of the relative utility of bankruptcy remedies and
remedies available under state law may have been influenced by
2 See, e.g., Byers v. McAuley, 149 U.S. 608, 619 (1893) (federal court has "no original
jurisdiction in respect to the administration of a deceased person"); Underground Elec.
Rys. v. Owsley, 176 F. 26, 28-37 (2d Cir. 1909) (while a federal court has no jurisdiction
in purely probate proceedings or general administration of an estate, its equity jurisdiction
nevertheless empowers it to appoint a receiver pending probate and appointment by a
proper state court).
3 See generally Nadler, supra note I.
4 11 U.S.C. § 26(1970).
5 IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 8.01-.02 (J. Moore ed. 1972).
6 Woods, C. J., in Adams v. Terrell, 4 F. 796, 801 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1880).7 See the discussion of abatement provisions in bankruptcy legislation enacted in 1800,
1841, 1867, and 1898 in Hull v. Dicks, 235 U.S. 584, 587 (19 15).
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the circumstance that the bankruptcy statute controlling the case
had been repealed at the time of decision. Certainly, his observa-
tions did not anticipate the development of the office and remedies
of the trustee in bankruptcy since 1898, nor the stultifying effect
that the development of federal bankruptcy law has had on the
growth of state insolvency procedures.
The capriciousness of law that makes federal jurisdiction de-
pend on the order in time of bankruptcy petition and death is
magnified by the circumstance that state probate procedures are
generally deficient insofar as creditors are concerned. 8 Mecha-
nisms for selecting personal representatives reflect the decedent's
wishes and family considerations that are frequently in conflict
with the interests of creditors. Only Massachusetts appears to
have a statute subjecting predeath payments to preferred creditors
to rights of recovery for the benefit of all creditors.9 Rights of
probate representatives to recover fraudulent and other transfers
by their decedents are not uniform among the states.' 0 These
rights may be further complicated in regard to in-state actions
against transferees by subject-matter limitations on the power of
probate courts." Territorial restrictions on the powers of probate
fiduciaries additionally cloud the process for recovery of fraudu-
lent transfers to persons who must be sued in other states. 12
There may also be serious impediments to creditors' remedies
in relation to assets that constitute the probate estate. If recovery
proceedings are necessary, a personal representative, as an officer
of the probate court, may seek court approval before beginning
litigation in order to be sure that his expenses are covered. But
the probate court to which he may apply for authority to sue may
not be able to entertain the recovery proceedings. 13 In many
states, complicated land-sale proceedings still must be brought to
subject land owned by the decedent to the claims of his credit-
gNadelmann, Insolvent Decedents' Estates, 49 MicH. L. REV. 1129 (1951); Note,
Suicide or Bankruptcy?, 5 STAN. L. REV. 74 (1952).
9 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 198,§§ 10A- 10C (1969).
10 E.g., In Illinois a personal representative, standing in the shoes of a decedent, cannot
impeach transfers made bythe decedent. Price v. Meier, 324 111. App. 313, 58 N.E.2d 197
(1944). In California, however, a personal representative has authority to set aside fraudu-
lent conveyances made by the decedent. CAL. PROB. CODE § 597 (West 1956).
11 E.g., OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2101.24, 2127.40 (1968) (probate court lacks juris-
diction to try title questions regarding land); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 701.19 (1968)
(outlining jurisdiction of probate court). See also Laude v. Cossins, 334 Mich. 622, 55
N.W.2d 123 (1952) (denying probate court jurisdiction to determine questions of title).
12 Compare Hare v. O'Brien, 233 Pa. 330, 82 A. 475 (1912) with Ghilain v. Couture, 84
N.H. 48, 146 A. 395 (1929).13 CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 613, 614 (West 1956); Merola v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App.
2d I, 269 P.2d 664 (1954). Cf OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2109.50, .52, .54 (1968).
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ors. 1 4 Finally, statutory fee schedules for personal representatives
and customarily generous probate fees for attorneys of probate
fiduciaries mean high costs of administration which, together with
exemptions, funeral bills, and family allowances that are com-
monly entitled to priority, frequently leave very little for creditors
of those assets that should be the primary fund for their satisfac-
tion.
As if all of this were not enough, there is another facet of
modern probate law that serves to harass creditors. Because of
the modern tendency of property owners to arrange titles to assets
so as to avoid probate, 15 creditors are forced to resort to extraor-
dinary remedies with increasing frequency in order to find assets
for satisfaction of claims. Joint tenancies, tenancies by the entire-
ties, deposit and savings contracts with death beneficiaries (in-
cluding many forms of arrangements for deferred compensation),
revocable trusts, and deeds framed to become effective at death,
are the most commonly used devices for the avoidance of probate.
Inheritance tax statistics from California indicate that for estates
with values between $ 10,000 and $400,000, joint tenancies handle
about 60 percent of all dollars moving by reason of death to
survivors. 16 Mere language in contracts and other legal in-
struments commonly validate these probate substitutes; it is unim-
portant that the decedent may have retained possession and full
control until the moment of his death, and that the death ben-
eficiary is a mere donee. Revocability does not uniformly make
transfers voidable by creditors under state rules,' 7 and attack via
14OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2127.01 et seq. (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1972); N.Y.
SURR. CT. PRO. § 1901 et seq. (McKinney 1967), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1972);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 202, § I et seq. (1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 225-252 (Supp.
1972); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 780-793 (1956), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
15 Lay and professional interest in probate avoidance can be identified by the number
and notoriety of publications on the subject in recent years. The best known, of course, is
N. DACEY, How To AVOID PROBATE (1966). This paperback, consisting of fifty-five pages
of text and 280 pages of forms in duplicate and instructions, was described in late June of
1966 as being in its tenth week on national, nonfiction best seller lists. The Probate
Bonanza, NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1966, at 78. More than 673,000 copies had been sold by
May, 1967. Advertisement, N.Y. Times, May 3, 1967, at 41. See also Editorial, Avoiding
Probate, 52 A.B.A.J. 938 (1966); Taylor, You Can Avoid the Probate Trap, READER'S
DIGEST, June, 1970, at 93. Articles warning readers of probate pitfalls also have been
influential. See Time to Clean Up Our Probate Courts, READER'S DIGEST, Jan., 1970, at
112. The literature has not been limited to lay articles. See J. CORCORAN, ALTERNATIVES
TO PROBATE (i11. Institute for Continuing Legal Education 1971); Hines, Real Property
Joint Tenancies: Law, Fact, and Fancy, 51 IOWA L. REV. 582 (1966).16 Computed from Table 22, INHERITANCE AND GIFT TAX DIVISION, OFFICE OF STATE
CONTROLLER, STATISTICS OF CALIFORNIA STATE INHERITANCE TAX: 1964 (1965).
17 One leading commentator has written:
In several other cases it has been held that the fact that a trust is revocable
does not enable the settlor's creditors to reach the trust estate. In the absence
of a statute otherwise providing, the courts have taken the view that the mere
SPRING 1973]
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the fraudulent transfer route involves difficulties in determining
the time of the transfer and the decedent's solvency at that time.' 8
Several circumstances may indicate that this curious vacuum of
protection for creditors may not result in serious hardships and
thus does not warrant complex solutions. The defects in state
probate protections for creditors are not new, and the gap in
federal law in relation to insolvent decedents' estates has existed
throughout the history of our bankruptcy rules.'9 Nevertheless,
no known statistical stidy suggests that creditors are being dis-
appointed in relation to collections from estates. Furthermore,
representatives of commercial crecitors remained totally silent
during the seven years of preliminary discussions and drafting of
the Uniform Probate Code (UPC or Code). A provision in the
first draft that would have enabled the probate court, on petition,
to order estates into bankruptcy under certain conditions was
dropped from the second draft because it invited complex dis-
cussions that would have distracted attention from more pressing
matters.20 No creditor representatives indicated interest in this
modification. The committees in charge of preparation of the
Code were encouraged to assume that large unsecured debts were
not likely to be owed by elderly persons and thus by decedents,
and that commercial creditors relied on credit life insurance and
voluntary payments by survivors who were anxious to maintain
their own credit ratings, rather than relying on probate remedies.
Some of these signals are nonetheless patently misleading, and
others are not persuasive on the question of whether federal law
should be changed to remedy the theoretical problem. It is not
surprising to find that studies of probate court records reveal few
cases in which known claimants went unpaid. 21 Creditors are
unlikely to file claims when their information leads them to con-
clude that there will be insufficient assets to cover costs, priority
claims, and family exemptions. Moreover, probate laws frequently
permit release without administration of estates that are repre-
fact that the settlor has power to obtain a reconveyance of the trust property
does not subject him to a duty to his creditors to do so for their benefit, nor
does it make him so far the potential owner of the trust estate that creditors
can treat it as his property.
4A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 330.12, at 2614- 15 (3d ed. 1967). It is generally held,
however, that creditors may reach deposits in a tentative trust savings account. Id. at
2617.
18 See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 4-7.
19 Nadelmann, supra note 8, at 1138-44.20 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (UPC) § 317 (First Tent. Draft, July 19, 1966). Compare
id.§ 3-410 (Summer 1967 Draft, July 14, 1967). See also id. § 394 (First Tent. Draft, July
19, 1966).




sented to be of small value above encumbrances, 22 so that probate
court files are useless as an indicator of the amount of unpaid bills
in a significant number of estates.
The argument that emphasizes lack of demand for legal change
by creditors is unpersuasive. If the social cost is tolerable, rules
should be framed to anticipate and avoid clear hardships in iso-
lated cases. The absence of organized creditor complaints regard-
ing inadequate protection in insolvent decedents' estates suggests
only that the problem is less concerning than others; it does not
eliminate the certainty of avoidable loss for individual creditors in
isolated cases.
Do community mores indicate that creditors should bear the
risks of loss from death that are implicit in the present arrange-
ment? A negative answer is suggested by informal surveys in the
Chicago area by students of Professor Dunham which indicated
that many merchants rely on voluntary payments by surviving
household members more than on collection from personal repre-
sentatives of deceased debtors.23 The defects of the probate sys-
tem that tend to qualify the assumption that decedents' creditors
come before inheritances clearly does not contradict it. Probate
laws are notoriously insensitive to calls for change from any but
regular members of the probate bureaucracy.2 4 Nothing significant
can be derived from the fact that creditors have not sought
changes or improvements in state laws, for creditors surely would
seek desired changes through bankruptcy laws rather than attempt
to struggle with fifty-one sets of probate laws.
Nevertheless, it may be asserted that opening bankruptcy pro-
ceedings to insolvent decedents' estates will result in turmoil and
interference with settled state prerogatives that are not warranted
by a speculative gain for creditors. To the extent that this point of
view reflects an assumption that local probate officials and attor-
neys are happily in control of smoothly functioning systems which
they will struggle to retain, it can be questioned. Probate proce-
dures in most states are being challenged and changed under the
pressures of probate avoidance and of the Uniform Probate Code.
Probate officials have resisted change and have lost credibility.
22 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 708.41 (1968).
23 1 must rely on my recollection of conversations with Professor Allison Dunham, of
the University of Chicago, for this statement. The students making the surveys worked
with Professor Dunham when he was preparing his article, The Method, Process and
Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241 (1963).
24 See, e.g., Dupont, The Impact of the Uniform Probate Code on Court Structure, 6 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 375, 375 n.l (1973); Dupont, The Impact of the Uniform Probate Code
on Connecticut Court Structure, 2 CONN. L. REv. 563 (1970); Brennan, Probate Reform,
42 CONN. B.J. 1 (1968).
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Fee schedules based on percentages of estates are being elim-
inated,25 along with the assumption that state courts should super-
vise settlement of decedents' estates. 26 In short, there is good
reason to believe that this is an especially opportune time to
propose some shifts of authority to federal courts.
The recommendations that follow may appear to invite bank-
ruptcy proceedings for many estates. But the risk may be exagger-
ated, for most decedents are elderly with few assets and fewer
debts.27 Also, two key recommendations relating to a time limit
on petitions for bankruptcy of decedents' estates and to other
qualifications that must be met by petitioners in federal proceed-
ings are designed to lessen state apprehensions concerning loss of
control over large numbers of estates. Indeed, these restraints
should encourage states to alter their probate rules so that the
need for recourse to bankruptcy court may be reduced.
The major recommendations fall into seven groups. First, peti-
tioners for bankruptcy proceedings for decedents' estates must
either be or represent creditors. To qualify a petition for bank-
ruptcy of a decedent's estate, the petitioner either should be a
personal representative or one or more creditors having unse-
cured claims amounting to $ 1,000 or more. Also, the petition
should indicate that substantial advantage for unsecured creditors
will result from bankruptcy as opposed to state probate proceed-
ings. The bankruptcy tribunal should have discretion to accept or
decline a petition containing proper allegations. With minor ex-
ceptions, efforts to move a decedent's estate into bankruptcy must
be commenced within six months after death.
Second, state law should be accepted for purposes of determin-
ing the existence and beneficiaries of exemptions given to the
spouse and children of a decedent whose estate is bankrupt, but
federal ceilings should be established on the amounts that will be
allowed. State law quirks that sometimes require distinction for
exemption purposes between "probate estate" assets and other
assets subject to creditors' claims in cases of insolvency should be
disregarded in bankruptcy.
Third, local nonclaim provisions operating to exclude some
creditors from some assets should be ignored in bankruptcy; the
short statute of limitations on bankruptcy proceedings should be
2 See, e.g., Hauptfuhrer, The Draft Statement of Principles Regarding Probate
Charges and Expenses: A Commentary, 7 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST J. 740
(1972); Moore, Attorneys' Fees Under the Code, UPC NOTES, Dec., 1972, at I.
26 This assumption is expressed by the General Comment to Article 3 of the Uniform
Probate Code.
27 Dunham, supra note 23, at 247, 263-64.
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relied upon to prevent the possibility of bankruptcy from clouding
inheritances and delaying the closing of estates.
Fourth, federal laws should recognize reasonable funeral ex-
penses of a decedent whose estate becomes bankrupt as a claim
entitled to priority over all others except expenses of adminis-
tration. When bankruptcy proceedings for estates supercede prior
state probate proceedings, probate court orders allowing funeral
expenses, fees for special administrators, appraisers, attorneys,
and other expenses of administration should be subject to review
for reasonableness by the bankruptcy tribunal in all cases except
where the probate court order has been entered after notice and
opportunity to be heard have been given to creditors. Claims
perfected under state law proceedings probably should be proved
again in bankruptcy. In any event, federal standards will govern
allowance and classification. Save for quite small claims, amounts
paid to claimants in prior probate administrations should be sub-
ject to refund to the trustee except where precluded by res judi-
cata.
Fifth, the bankruptcy court should exercise the powers of a
state probate court in instances where an order of the probate
court is necessary in relation to a widow's election or to the
determination of family allowances, and in relation to distribution
of any surplus.
Sixth, the title and rights of a trustee for an insolvent dece-
dent's estate should be substantially the same as those of a trustee
for a living debtor. In order to accomplish this purpose vis-a-vis
powers and other rights a debtor may have exercised for his own
benefit, the title of a trustee for a bankrupt decedent's estate
should relate to the debtor's interests as of a moment before death
rather than to the date of the petition.
Seventh, rights available to a trustee for an insolvent decedent's
estate under Sections 60 and 67 of the present statute should be
measured by a period of four months before death rather than four
months prior to the petition for federal relief.
I!. CONDITIONS RELATING TO INSTITUTION OF
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS FOR INSOLVENT
DECEDENTS' ESTATES
A. Who May Petition
1. Creditors of the Decedent- Because postmortem bank-
ruptcy proceedings will lack any purpose of debtor rehabilitation,
only persons who have interests either as or on behalf of unse-
SPRING 1973]
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cured creditors of the decedent should be eligible to petition for
bankruptcy. Thus, inheritors from the decedent, including even
those close family members who may have rights to exempt
property or to allowances having priority over unsecured credi-
tors under state law, should be excluded.
2. Restrictions on Creditor-Petitioners-What restrictions, if
any, should be placed on creditors who might petition for bank-
ruptcy proceedings involving an estate? The threat of nuisance
proceedings by small creditors is probably more fanciful than real,
but the draftsmen of the Uniform Probate Code found it ex-
pedient to impose a minimum claim-size requirement at a point in
the Code that presented a somewhat analogous question. Under
the UPC, a personal representative does not need to post bond to
guarantee performance of his duties unless bond is demanded by a
person the value of whose apparent interest in the estate exceeds
a stated statutory minimum. The Code suggests but does not
prescribe $1,000 as the appropriate sum. 2 8 Some similar restric-
tion that appears to screen out small claims will calm fears that
bankruptcy proceedings will be resorted to in routine cases.
Hence, one or more creditors whose claims aggregate in excess of
some figure, possibly $ 1,000, should be required to qualify a
creditor petition. However, there is no reason to require approval
of creditors having claims in excess of $ 1,000 before a personal
representative may petition for bankruptcy.
3. Personal Representative Petitioners-Questions may be
raised about whether a personal representative, frequently consid-
ered to be an officer of the probate court that appointed him,
should be permitted to serve as a petitioner for a superceding
bankruptcy proceeding. Although the picture will change as the
Uniform Probate Code gradually spreads across the country,
most probate laws treat the personal representative as a
quasi-official of the probate court who is subject to the continuing
supervision of the court until the estate is distributed and closed.2 9
The intrusion of federal law into the domain of a state court would
be quite apparent if federal authority invites an officer of the local
tribunal to act in a way that can be seen to contradict his obliga-
tion to his appointing authority. On the other hand, it is not
always easy to know whether a personal representative is or is not
considered to be an instrumentality of the authority that appointed
him. A Texas executor appointed under a "nonintervention" will
clearly is not subject to continuing control of the probate court,
28 UPC § 3-605.
29 31 AM. JUR. 2d Executors and Administrators § 154 (1967); 2 & 3 J. WOERNER,
AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION §§229, 235, 572 (3rd ed. 1923).
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differing from a Texas administrator in intestacy. 30 In Georgia,
something resembling "independent administration" is possible
under a will that excuses an executor from making "returns" to
the court of appointment. 3' In view of this uncertainty, it is
suggested that the bankruptcy court be authorized but not obliged
to require personal representative petitioners to secure approval
from the court of appointment. If creditors are permitted to act as
petitioners for a bankruptcy takeover in any event, the role of the
local probate court would not be an important one.
Should a petition in bankruptcy by a personal representative be
subject to any restriction? Assuming that there will be no guaran-
tee that former personal representatives have priority as bank-
ruptcy trustees for insolvent estates that are accepted into bank-
ruptcy, there should be no concern that personal representatives
might find some personal advantage in moving estates into bank-
ruptcy. Should personal representative petitioners be required to
show demands for bankruptcy by creditors? The Uniform Probate
Code uses this device in Section 6-107 in relation to the right of a
personal representative to pursue surviving co-owners of survi-
vorship bank accounts when the demands of creditors cannot be
covered by the primary probate estate. Still, the scheme of Sec-
tion 6-107 is rooted in a concern to keep personal representatives
from taking unnecessary steps merely to increase the estate on
which their fees may be calculated. With fee incentives neutral-
ized by the possibility of a different federal fiduciary, there is no
point to any restriction like that in Section 6-107 in new bank-
ruptcy rules.
4. Person with Priority for Appointment as Personal Represen-
tative- Interest in starting bankruptcy proceedings may arise be-
fore the appointment of a personal representative by a state court,
and before or after any will naming an executor may have been
admitted to probate. Assuming, for the moment, that a duly ap-
pointed personal representative may be a suitable person to in-
stitute bankruptcy proceedings, the suitability of a person who is
merely nominated by a will of the debtor that may or may not
have been validated in state proceedings occurring after the debt-
or's death, but who has not been appointed or qualified as person-
al representative is less clear.3 2 Recognition as a suitable petition-
er to such a person should be denied, for recognition would
contradict local assumptions that letters are necessary to confer
30 TEX. PROB. CODE § 145 et seq. (1956),as amended, (Supp. 1972).3 1 GA. CODE ANN. § 113- 1414 (1959).
32 Under English law, the probate of a will gave an executor named therein sufficient
authority to act. In the United States, he must receive letters and otherwise qualify before
he can act. 2 J. WOERNER, supra note 29, at § 186.
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any authority. Creditors can be protected without any incursion
on this state law principle. Thus, creditors of a decedent should
not be forced to await a state court appointment or to be depen-
dent on the willingness of a state court appointee to act.
5. Personal Representative Appointed by Domiciliary Court-
A state court appointee from a jurisdiction other than that of the
decedent's domicile probably should not be recognized, partially
because creditors will be able to petition in bankruptcy even
though there is no suitable state representative and partially be-
cause the lead of the Uniform Probate Code to discourage pro-
bate appointments in any state other than that of the decedent's
domicile should be followed?3 Surely federal proceedings for
insolvent estates should embrace all of the property of the debtor
and avoid the state law phenomenon that frequently results in
separate probate administrations for each state in which a dece-
dent may have left land.3 4 Hence, one petition should serve to
supercede any number of separate state proceedings that may
have been commenced. Only the personal representative from the
principal place of probate administration should be granted the
power to trigger bankruptcy for all segments of the estate. It is
true that the Uniform Probate Code and most existing laws recog-
nize the possibility that the only probate administration for a
given decedent may occur in a state which was not the decedent's
domicile.3 5 In recognition of this, a petitioning personal represen-
tative should be required to state that he has been appointed by a
proper authority either in the state of the decedent's domicile or in
a state selected by the decedent to control the principal adminis-
tration of his estate. This requirement probably should not be
jurisdictional.
6. Creditors of the Personal Representative-A decedent's es-
tate may be solvent at the date of his death, but subsequently
become insolvent because of loss of asset values or the discovery
of previously unknown claims. Also, continuing operation of the
decedent's business by the personal representative may result in
postmortem insolvency. Postmortem insolvency from either of the
first two causes probably should be lumped with cases in which
the decedent died insolvent for purposes of bankruptcy remedies
relating to estates. Insolvency resulting from postmortem debts
incurred by the personal representative might fall in a different
category as a result of the common law rule that estate fiduciaries
33 Wellman, How the Uniform Probate Code Deals with Estates that Cross State Lines,
5 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE& TRUST J. 159, 162-63 (1970).34E.g., Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900).
35 UPC §§ 2-602, 3-203(g).
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incur personal liability for obligations arising from the estate busi-
ness. 36 In practical effect, the rule means that postmortem credit-
ors may have access to the personal liability of the personal
representative in the event estate assets are insufficient to cover
their claims. The rule, however, can be made inapplicable by the
personal representative's contracts, and it is being reversed by
statute for both contract and tort obligations.3 7 In any event, the
estate should be the primary source of payment of debts incurred
by a personal representative. The point should be disregarded
insofar as it might be urged as a reason for preventing postmortem
creditors from moving an estate into bankruptcy.
Postmortem creditors frequently take ahead of antemortem
claimants because their claims represent expenses of adminis-
tration. This distinction, however, does not appear to warrant
disqualification of postmortem creditors as petitioners in bank-
ruptcy for insolvent decedents' estates. Like antemortem credi-
tors, they have interests in recovery of fraudulent and preferential
transfers, and in bankruptcy standards regarding selection and
control of the trustee.
B. Allegations and Findings Required for
Bankruptcy of an Estate
Bankruptcy proceedings for decedents' estates should not be
available unless unsecured creditors can show a substantial likeli-
hood of greater recovery in bankruptcy than in probate court
proceedings. This judgment is based on several considerations.
First, the state courts can process many estate matters with
approximately the same efficiency and degree of achievement as
courts of bankruptcy. Second, federal remedies for important
cases will both meet a clear present need and serve to induce
states to repair their legislation, whereas the alternative assump-
tion that creditors might move any decedent's estate into bank-
ruptcy irrespective of need might stultify state law development.
Third, state courts are probably more accessible to the public and
more amenable to community needs than federal courts and thus
should be used in preference to federal courts except where
obvious injustice results. Finally, some form of state court pro-
ceedings are regularly instituted for most decedents' estates be-
fore solvency or insolvency is known, and removals to federal
36 Johnston v. Long, 30 Cal. 2d 54, 181 P.2d 645 (1947); Stone, A Theory of Liability of
Trust Estates for the Contracts and Torts of the Trustee, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1922):
Fulda & Pond, Tort Liability of Trust Estates, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 1332 (1941).37 See, e.g., UPC §§ 3-808, 7-306.
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court at the suit of creditors, which would double the expense of
legal proceedings in many cases, should not be routine.
Accordingly, petitioners for bankruptcy of a decedent's estate
should be required to show (1) that the estate is insolvent at the
time of the petition; and (2) that a greater return for creditors will
probably be available if bankruptcy proceedings are approved.
Additionally, the federal tribunal should possess discretion to
deny a petition that contains all required allegations.
1. Insolvency-Should balance sheet or equity insolvency be
required? Except where a decedent's estate continues the busi-
ness of the decedent or otherwise engages in an on-going enter-
prise, there is no place for the equity test of inability to meet debts
as they mature.3 8 Hence, the normal standard should be an excess
of obligations over assets available for payment; use of the equity
test should be restricted to petitioners who are creditors of a
business being operated by an estate. This standard, as applied to
estates, closely approximates the general standard of inability to
pay all debts that is now applicable to all bankrupts. 3 9 Moreover,
because there is no reason to deny federal proceedings to credi-
tors who become creditors of the estate after the decedent's death
and because bankruptcy should be available to all creditors for
use whenever the likelihood of debt payment becomes imperiled,
this test of insolvency should be related to the time of initiation of
the bankruptcy proceedings, rather than to the date of death.
Probate inventories might be conclusive or otherwise relied
upon in establishing asset values in bankruptcy petitions. Regard-
less of what the rules say, probate inventories will be used by
practical people who will accept them rather than invest time and
money in other investigations. Hence, to attempt to preclude their
use might not be practicable. It would be unwise, however, to
attach any particular significance for bankruptcy purposes to pro-
bate value lists, either for purposes of identifying what assets are
included in the estate or for determining the value of listed items.
Probate appraisals are commonly disregarded for purposes of
determining death taxes, even though they may have been ap-
proved by the court. Bankruptcy proceedings should not give
them more credence.
If the state court were to determine that there are insufficient
assets to cover funeral costs and family exemptions or to warrant
probate administration, the effect of that court's order releasing
the estate from probate administration either on the question of
381 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1.19, at 98-99 (J. Moore ed. 1971).
39 I1 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970).
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solvency or on the question of the need for bankruptcy is debat-
able. Res judicata may be involved, but these probate proceed-
ings are so notoriously lacking in fair notice to creditors and
useful examination by the probate judge that the federal posture
should be to disregard them, subject to ad hoc instances where res
judicata may be fairly asserted. The related question of the con-
clusiveness in bankruptcy of probate orders distributing estates,
as distinguished from orders releasing estates from administration,
probably will not arise if the recommendation for a six-month time
limit after death on bankruptcy petitions is accepted.40
Probate records of filed claims may be offered in bankruptcy
proceedings on the question of insolvency. There are several
reasons why these should not be accorded much weight. These
include: (1) the acknowledged tendency of creditors in some parts
of the country to ignore state law filing requirements; 41 (2) the
probability that creditors will not file claims unless asset lists
indicate the presence of enough estate to cover debts; and (3) the
presence in many estate files of questionable claims based on
family services for the decedent that may be tolerable for estate
settlement proceedings where no creditors' rights are affected, but
are unacceptable for any bankruptcy purpose.
What property should be included in the determination of in-
solvency? Should assets believed to be exempt from creditors'
claims be listed? What should be done concerning transfers made
before probate that might or might not be available to creditors of
insolvent estates under state law, but which would nevertheless
be subject to claims in bankruptcy? What about assets in states
other than the decedent's domicile where ancillary proceedings
may or may not have been commenced?
Insolvency for bankruptcy purposes is best determined by in-
cluding all personal estate remaining in the decedent's name in
spite of his death without limitation in terms of location. Real
estate in the decedent's name located in his domicile and all other
assets previously received by, or conceded to be due to, any
acting personal representative from other sources should be in-
cluded. The asset total should be reduced by expenses of adminis-
tration paid or incurred to date, funeral expenses, and family
exemptions. If the total is less than the total of known claims, the
estate should be deemed insolvent even though state laws may
make other assets subject to creditors' claims in cases of in-
solvency. Assets subject to outstanding security interests should
40 See text accompanying notes 44- 45 infra.
41 See note 23 supra.
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be treated so that only the excess of value over amount secured is
used in computing total assets.
This computation omits some values represented by voidable
or fraudulent transfers that might be, but have not yet been,
collected by or conceded to be due to the personal representative.
Recovery of these transfers through use of state procedures
frequently will be so difficult, however, that bankruptcy proce-
dures may be the preferred method of reaching them. In any
event, assessment of the probable ease or difficulty to be expected
in efforts to undo voidable transfers in state proceedings will
occur because of the requirement that the petitioner show that
some substantial advantage will follow approval of the bankruptcy
proceeding.
Similarly, real property belonging to the decedent's estate, but
located in states other than that in which the principal adminis-
tration of his estate is being had, should not be included in
computations to determine insolvency unless applicable rules give
the domiciliary representative easy access to them for purposes of
meeting obligations of the estate. The standards of the Uniform
Probate Code might be used to determine whether "easy" access
exists. Under the UPC, real estate in a nondomiciliary location
may be sold and the proceeds removed by the domiciliary person-
al representative if he files a copy of his appointment in a probate
office of the place of location and so subjects himself to the
jurisdiction of the courts of that state. 42 This procedure, which
must exist under the laws of the state of location in order to be
available to a representative from a state having statutes like the
UPC in effect, becomes unavailable if ancillary administration
proceedings are commenced before the domiciliary representative
acts. Again, however, a determination as to the ease or difficulty
to be anticipated in reaching out-of-state real estate could be
relevant in deciding whether cause for bankruptcy, in addition to
insolvency, exists.
2. Additional Cause for Bankruptcy- In addition to proof of
insolvency of the estate, a petitioner who seeks federal relief
relating to a decedent's estate should be required to show that
unsecured creditors probably will receive substantially more in
bankruptcy than they would receive if the state proceedings were
allowed to continue. Showing that substantial values have been
transferred outside of probate by transactions that are voidable by
creditors, but cannot be reached under state law or may be
reached only by expending substantially more time or money than
42 UPC §§ 4-204, 4-205. See also Wellman. supra note 33.
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would be involved in a bankruptcy turnover proceeding should
suffice. Alternatively, a case for federal relief would be presented
if the assets of the estate are located in more than one jurisdiction
and cannot be easily assembled without multiple state probate
proceedings. If no state probate proceeding has been commenced
prior to the filing of the federal petition, the showing that bank-
ruptcy might be the more efficient method of marshalling assets
and satisfying claims should be easier than where state probate
expense already has been incurred.
Where applicable state law appears to give a personal represen-
tative all remedies vis-a-vis preferential or fraudulent transfers
that would be available under federal law, bankruptcy should be
available nonetheless if the probate representative refuses to pur-
sue these remedies. This should be the case despite the avail-
ability of state remedies to compel performance by the personal
representative. This posture would exert pressure on a
foot-dragging personal representative to move in the interests of
creditors.
3. Discretion to Refuse Bankruptcy Petitions for Estates-The
foregoing discussion demonstrates that the range of questions that
the bankruptcy court should consider in deciding whether to ac-
cept or refuse a petition for an estate proceeding is quite broad.
Furthermore, the federal judgment may be influenced by factors
relating to the local probate court such as are within the court's
general knowledge. These circumstances support the recommen-
dation that the federal court should have discretion to accept or
reject an estate bankruptcy and that its judgment should be en-
titled to great weight.
4. Overriding Time Limitations on Bankruptcy Proceedings for
an Estate- Bankruptcy legislation relating to insolvent decedents'
estates must accommodate a variety of procedural possibilities
that may bear on the desirability of a federal limitation period on
bankruptcy proceedings: (1) no proceedings to probate the debt-
or's estate may have been commenced, and the estate has or has
not been released from administration; (2) probate administration
has been commenced and a personal representative has been
appointed but no distribution or release of assets to heirs has
occurred; (3) probate administration has been opened and all
assets of the estate have been disbursed by proper or improper
payments, but no court order discharging the personal representa-
tive has been entered, and the powers and liabilities of the person-
al representative are still viable; and (4) probate administration
has been closed by court order or statute.
Additional assets of the probate estate or the possibility of
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recovery of fraudulent or preferential transfers may be discovered
before or after any of these procedural stages. Moreover, although
state nonclaim periods have run and some or all unpaid creditors
have been barred from recourse to conventional probate assets, it
is possible under some state law patterns that unpaid creditors
will not be barred from participating in recoveries of fraudulent or
preferential transfers. 43
When, if ever, should it be too late to commence bankruptcy
proceedings in relation to an insolvent estate? Federal law should
include a relatively short, six-month, limitation period running
from death, after which it would be too late for anyone to institute
bankruptcy. This period would balance the need of creditors for a
decent opportunity after learning of their debtor's death to dis-
cover facts and plan strategies designed to minimize their losses
against the legitimate concerns of those who are interested in an
early end to questions about the decedent's affairs. Six months
from death also approximates the minimum time under current
state law required for complete settlement of a decedent's es-
tate, aa and matches approximately the minimum period for safe
distributions under the Uniform Probate Code.45 If this recom-
mendation is accepted, there will be very little likelihood that
petitions for bankruptcy will be filed after a probate adminis-
tration has proceeded to completion.
A definite period running from death is recommended rather
than a period keyed to distribution or closing of a probate estate
because of the wide variety of conditions and events that may
constitute distribution or closing under existing state laws. More-
over, there is little reason to make the federal limitation period
depend on whether a probate proceeding has been commenced,
for it is contemplated that unpaid creditors of a decedent will have
standing to initiate bankruptcy whether or not a personal repre-
sentative has been appointed.
Some exceptions to the proposed six-month period may be
necessary to assure that creditors will not be precluded from
resorting to bankruptcy proceedings in some difficult cases. One
might be recognized for creditors of an estate operating a going
business. This would be a troublesome exception, all the possible
implications of which are difficult to foresee. Nevertheless, it
involves cases where predeath creditors may not have the in-
formation necessary to let them determine whether bankruptcy
43 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 204 (Supp. 1972) (claims barred as to "inventoried" assets
only).
44 id.
I UPC § 3-1003(a).
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should be commenced, and where postmortem creditors have
been induced to rely for too long on their priority for expenses of
administration. Hence, it appears worthy of notice. Another ex-
ception may be required for cases where creditors of the decedent
are prevented by misrepresentation or neglect of a personal repre-
sentative from learning of information bearing on the estate's
solvency.
II1. RECOMMENDED FEDERAL STANDARDS RELATING
TO FAMILY EXEMPTIONS CREATED BY STATE LAW
A. Existing Homestead and Other Family
Exemptions
Most state probate codes recognize specific or value ex-
emptions that serve to put the decedent's spouse and dependent
children ahead of unsecured creditors in relation to some portion
of the probate estate. Homestead statutes constitute a major,
although unpredictable, part of the story. Typically a homestead
exemption is available only as to real estate occupied by the
spouse or minor children at the death of the owner. Limitations in
terms of dollar value 46 and size or acreage 47 vary widely. Some-
times no residence is required. 48 In some states homestead is
merged at death with a spouse's right to reject the provisions of a
decedent's will and claim a statutory share.49 In at least seven
states, no provision is made for homestead exemptions 0
Homestead and dower are not, however, the only forms of
exemptions. In some states, of which Ohio is an example, the
spouse's exemption includes a percentage or an amount that is
excluded from the probate inventory and thus from costs of ad-
ministration?5 Other exempt rights or sums may be available in
the form of quarantine (a widow's right to remain in the mansion
house of the deceased for a year or other designated period),52
widow's allowance (an amount, usually fixed by the probate judge,
46 See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 379.080(2) (1972) ($1000 limit); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
236, § 18 (Supp. 1972) ($10,000 limit); MISS. CODE ANN. § 318 (Supp. 1972) ($ 15,000
limit); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1260 (Supp. 1973) ($20,000 limit).
47See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. 10, §4(a)(l). (160 acres for property outside of the
municipality; one-half acre within a municipality, regardless of value).
48 E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-301 (1955).
49 E.g., MICti. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 702.69-70 (1968).
5 0 S. RIESENFELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS'
PROTECTION 232-33 (1967).
51 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2115.13 (1968) (20 percent of inventory with a $2,500
ceiling).52 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2117.24 (1968).
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to support the surviving spouse and dependent children during the
period of probate administration) 53 or family exemptions relating.
to furniture, tools, clothing, or other specified kinds of assets of
the deceased. 54
Community property rights of a surviving spouse, being derived
from the spouse's preexisting ownership interest in half of com-
munity property, normally would not be seen as exempt rights
relating to a decedent's estate. However, if some of the decedent's
debts, for example, those attributed to him as manager of the
community, may be satisfied from the entire community estate,
the entire community estate becomes subject to some claims and
to probate administration. Consequently, homestead and other
forms of exemption may become pertinent. About all that is
predictable in community property states is that there will be no
recognition of dower as a possible source of exemption.
B. Family Exemptions Under the Uniform
Probate Code
The Uniform Probate Code recognizes three categories of fami-
ly exemptions and abolishes dower. A homestead allowance in the
suggested amount of $5,000 in value from any form of estate
assets takes the place of specific exemptions that relate only to
homestead real estate.55 Chattel property worth up to $3,500 is
exempt, and if there is not that much in unencumbered value in
chattels of the estate, dollars from any source in the estate may be
used to make up the difference. 56 A family allowance of up to
$500 per month for one year may be awarded by the personal
representative for the surviving spouse or dependent children, and
higher allowances as needed for this purpose may be approved by
the court. 7 Like the family allowance, the homestead allowance
is available only if a spouse or a minor or dependent child sur-
vives. The $3,500 chattel exemption is available to all children
who survive when there is no spouse. The total of these cate-
gories, presumably $14,500 in most cases, is immediately dis-
tributable in kind or cash to the statutory beneficiaries and has
explicit priority over costs of administration and creditors' claims.
53 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 702.68 (1968); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 861.31
(Supp. 1972).54 See, e.g., N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §5-3.1 (McKinney Supp. 1972);
ALASKA STAT. § 13.11. 125 (1972) (exempting house trailers as well),
55 UPC §2-401.56 1d. § 2-402.
57 Id. §§ 2-403, 2-404.
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Also, transfers effective at death by multiple-party accounts (joint,
payable on death, tentative trust accounts) are subject to recovery
by the personal representative for beneficiaries of family ex-
emptions and creditors. 58 Other voidable transfers may generate
assets for payment of creditors, but not for the satisfaction of
family exemptions. 59
C. Bankruptcy Act Policy
Homestead exemptions allowed by the laws of states of estab-
lished residency are preserved to debtors in bankruptcy by Sec-
tion 6 of the Bankruptcy Act 60 and are given to the surviving
spouse and dependent children of the deceased debtor by Section
861 when a bankrupt dies. Case authority relating to the
pre-Chandler Act statute extended the concession for state ex-
emptions to dower rights of a surviving spouse and to probate
allowances for spouse and dependent children, exemptions which
were not available to the debtor as of the filing of the petition.62
The present statute appears to preclude these extensions.
Some exemptions for surviving spouses and minor children of
debtors who leave bankrupt estates should be granted by federal
law without restriction to those exemptions that could have been
claimed by the debtor had he lived. A living debtor's earnings
during bankruptcy remain available for support of his spouse and
minor children. Family exemptions and allowances created by
state probate law have the effect of substituting a share of the
decedent's probate estate for the loss of earning power resulting
from death. Further, existing probate law patterns that will be
altered by the extension of bankruptcy to insolvent decedents'
estates feature exemptions for spouse and minor children that
arise at death. If federal law restricts the exemptions available to
survivors to those available to living debtors, state law would
respond by expanding exemptions of the homestead type. This
sort of countermove, which would unnecessarily jeoparize collec-
tion prospects against living debtors, would be unfortunate. Also,
resistance to any extension of bankruptcy law into the domain of
the states, would be greater if the proposal ignored state policy
that protects a minimum "stake" for close survivors without refer-
ence to exemptions available to a living debtor.
58 Id. § 6-107.
59 Id. § 3-7 10.
60 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
61 Id. § 26.
62 Hull v. Dicks, 235 U.S. 584 (1915).
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D. Remaining Considerations
Assuming that bankruptcy policy will respect state law ex-
emptions for close family survivors, several questions remain.
What state law should be accepted for purposes of determining
allowable family exemptions? Should the bankruptcy court or the
probate court function where applicable state law calls for a court
order determining allowances? How should allowances be pro-
cessed when there is no probate proceeding? If a state court has
made an order concerning allowances before bankruptcy proceed-
ings are commenced, must the order be respected in bankruptcy
even though it grants more than might have been awarded in the
federal court? Should probate allowances come ahead of credit-
ors' claims in values recovered by avoiding preferential or fraudu-
lent transfers? Should bankruptcy law be framed with a view to
coercing states to enact uniform laws relating to family ex-
emptions?
Some of these questions would be eliminated or reduced if
federal rather than state law were made controlling in relation to
the recognition of family exemptions in insolvent decedents' es-
tates. There are compelling reasons for establishing federal ceil-
ings on state exemptions that will be recognized in bankruptcy. If
these reasons are accepted, it might be felt that it would be
simpler merely to substitute federal exemptions.
The most obvious reason for a ceiling on state law exemptions
recognized in bankruptcy of insolvent decedents' estates is to free
interstate commerce of the effects of wide disparity in state ex-
emption laws. There is no dollar ceiling on the value of improve-
ments that may be involved when a Florida widow takes up to a
half-acre of urban residential property in the decedent's name
away from his creditors as a homestead.6 3 There is no dollar
ceiling on the amount a Michigan probate judge may allow to a
widow by way of support during probate administration.6 4
Additionally, probate exemption statutes tend to include higher
amounts than general exemption provisions. There has been great
pressure in recent years to reduce inheritance costs and delays
that are caused by the ancient assumption that all estates must be
court-administered for the benefit of creditors. Lawyers and pro-
bate judges generally are more willing to adjust the probate net so
that estates which are too small to warrant their time and atten-
63 FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 4; FLA. STAT. ANN. §731.34 (1964).
64 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 702.68(1) (1968) grants the widow and minor children




tion are exempt from administration than they are to concede that
court administration may be needed only in cases involving actual
disputes. Consequently, the amounts currently being recommend-
ed in the states for homestead exemptions, or as the ceilings on
estates that may be exempted from administration, are running
higher. For example, the state bar in California may renew recent
efforts to secure enactment of legislation that will increase exempt
estates to $10,000 when there is no land, and to $30,000 if land is
involved. 65 In Colorado, a bar association bill that might bring the
Uniform Probate Code to the state uses $10,000 rather than
$5,000 as the amount of homestead allowance.6 6 The enacted
version of the Code in Idaho increases the homestead allowance
from $5,000 to $14,000 when a spouse and minor children sur-
vive, 67 and in Alaska the new law uses $12,000 as the homestead
allowance figure and permits a possible additional exemption for a
house trailer worth up to $8,000.68 Recent legislation in Wiscon-
sin now exempts estates consisting of $10,000 or less in unencum-
bered value from probate if a spouse survives,6 9 and in Michigan,
estates of up to $7,500 are exempt if a spouse or minor child
survives. 70
Arguably, the conditions and recent developments outlined
above should lead those responsible for the shape of federal
bankruptcy laws to adhere to the existing formulation that would
give survivors of deceased debtors only those exemptions that
were available to the decedents. As indicated earlier, 71 however,
there are sound substantive and political reasons for recognizing
survivors' exemptions in bankruptcy. Further, the higher that
state probate law exemptions become, the greater the inducement
to creditors to seek relief in bankruptcy. Correlatively, if the
proposed extension of bankruptcy to insolvent decedents' estates
follows a hard line on the matter of survivors' exemptions, opposi-
tion to it in Congress surely will increase.
There are considerations weighing both for and against the idea
that federal legislation should be the source of survivors' ex-
emptions in bankrupt estates. On the plus side, there would be
uniformity rather than ceilings that would leave creditors better
6s Los Angeles Daily J., Nov. I, 1972, at I.
66 Information taken from Probate and Trust Law Section, Committee on Uniform
Probate Code, Suggested Changes to Official Text, received from Colorado State Bar
Association.
67 IDAHO CODE § 15-2-401 (Supp. 1972).
68See note 54 supra.
79Wls. STAT. ANN § 867.02 (1971).
70 MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 708.39, as amended by Mich. P.A., 1972, ch. 264.
71 See part Il A supra.
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off in states where the debtor's law provided lower exemptions.
Also, some simplicity in administration should result if federal
trustees could disregard substantive and procedural subtleties re-
lating to exemptions. Problems of choice of law relating to ex-
emptions would be avoided. Some troublesome problems caused
by different priorities between beneficiaries of exemptions and
creditors vis- t-vis probate and nonprobate assets subject to claims
would be sidestepped.
The case for a federal ceiling on survivors' exemptions that
would limit rather than replace state law on exemptions is less
clear. A ceiling, particularly a fairly generous one, would involve
a less dramatic incursion of federal law in an area traditonally left
for state control. Creditors who required and obtained priority
over surviviors' rights under state law might be (or feel) jeopard-
ized by a federal replacement for the state exemption system.
Future developments in state law relating to administration of
insolvent decedents' estates would be encouraged to a greater
extent by a policy of federal ceilings that made it possible for
states to adjust their rules so as to reduce the attractiveness of
bankruptcy to creditors.
On balance, however, a policy of federal ceilings rather than
creation of a new federal system of survivors' exemptions would
be more desirable. This choice requires at least some treatment of
the several problems of detail that were posited earlier.
Present bankruptcy law identifies the law of the state where the
debtor resided for at least six months prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy proceeding as controlling in determining ex-
emptions. 72 The Uniform Probate Code directs reference to the
state of domicile at death for purposes of determining family
exemptions. 73 In spite of the greater definiteness provided by the
present bankruptcy rule, the UPC's resolution on this point may
be preferable. A debtor may not have resided in any state for six
months before his death or the filing of the petition, yet it would
be capricious to deny his survivors some exemptions from credit-
ors' claims as an offset for the shock and loss of earning power
caused by death.
Where applicable state law calls for a probate court order to fix
family allowances, the court of bankruptcy should perform the
function of the probate court unless the state court has acted
before the personal representative received notice of the bank-
72 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
73 UPC § 2-401 et seq.
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ruptcy petition. This arrangement would cover the situation in
which a bankruptcy proceeding for an estate is commenced by
creditors before any probate proceeding occurs.
If a probate court has made a determination concerning a
family exemption prior to bankruptcy, it should be accepted in the
later federal proceeding in all but the most unusual cases, such as
those involving mistake concerning, or concealment of, facts bear-
ing on the probable solvency of the estate. Local magistrates
should be trusted to be fair to both family and creditors. There-
fore the federal legislation should not be drawn in a way that
would encourage creditors to resort to bankruptcy merely to
obtain a new determination of exemptions.
One point of considerable difficulty remains. Probate ex-
emptions and priorities for members of the decedent's close fami-
ly are usually related to the so-called "probate estate." Usually
the "probate estate" does not embrace assets that were trans-
ferred by the decedent by gift transfers which are avoidable only
at the insistence of creditors because of insolvency. It is less
clear, however, whether the estate for purposes of family ex-
emptions includes other assets which some state statutes enable a
personal representative to recover in cases where probate assets
are inadequate to satisfy all claims.
For example, in states in which land passes to the heirs or
devisees and may not be sold or possessed by the personal repre-
sentative unless statutory conditions for land-sale proceedings
exist, one will usually find allowances for the widow and depen-
dent children included among the charges that are relevant to
determining cause for sale.74 Similarly, Section 6-107 of the UPC
expressly includes family allowances with creditors' claims as
items for which recovery of balances received by surviving parties
or beneficiaries of multiple-party accounts may be permitted. On
the other hand, other rights given personal representatives of
insolvent estates appear to be restricted to instances involving
unpaid creditors. 75
It is apparent that there is considerable confusion in state law
in this area. Variance in statutory language, fuzziness about the
role of personal representatives and probate courts in relation to
exemptions and voidable transfers, and the capriciousness of giv-
ing families priority over creditors as to some assets passing at
death but not as to others dominate the scene. Moreover, the
74 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2127.02 (1968).
75 Examples may be found in MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 556.123 (Supp. 1972).
SPRING 1973]
Journal of Law Reform
relationships between family exemptions and creditors can de-
pend on whether the decedent's assets are located in one state or
are found in several. 76
Bankruptcy should disregard state law subtleties with reference
to the relative priorities in bankruptcy of family exemptions and
creditors in probate estate assets, power of appointment assets,
multiple-party account assets, and assets recovered from
recipients of fraudulent transfers. State law should be accepted as
controlling in relation to who may be entitled to family ex-
emptions and possibly for determining the maximum amount. It
will, however, overly complicate bankruptcy administration of
decedents' estates to force trustees to respect and keep track of
all categories of assets in which family survivors and creditors
may have different priorities under state law. Family survivors
will gain rather than lose from this recommendation, for it would
mean that all funds available to the trustee for satisfaction of
unsecured claims are treated as if they were part of the probate
estate from which the family may receive full allowances before
creditors are paid. Creditors should gain enough through new
assets and remedies available for their protection in bankruptcy to
warrant yielding something to family allowances on this point.
The issue thus becomes what standards should federal law
encourage by an exemption ceiling policy or establish by provi-
sions designed to replace state law exemptions for survivors.
Because they were fixed with a view to eliminating probate ad-
ministration for many small estates presently caught in the pro-
bate net, the exemption levels recommended by the Uniform
Probate Code are somewhat higher than those presently pre-
vailing in many states. They may be too high from the standpoint
of creditors. Nevertheless, death is not a significant factor in
many bankruptcies, and creditors might be willing to yield more
than they must now by way of exemptions from probate estates
for spouses and dependent children in exchange for new remedies
and uniformity of laws respecting claims against decedents.
Accordingly, survivors' exemptions for spouse and minor or
dependent children should be allowed in accordance with appli-
cable state law in amounts not to exceed a total of $14,500 per
estate. There is little point to recognizing any exemption to other
survivors. The UPC's exempt chattel provision of $3,500 to be
taken in kind or cash, which is available for nondependent adult
children-survivors, makes some sense in solvent estates but
should not be recognized in bankruptcy.
76 See Scoles, Conflict of Laws and Nonbarrable Interests in Administration of Dece-
dents' Estates, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 151 (1955).
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IV. STATE NONCLAIM STATUTES AND OTHER STATUTES
OF LIMITATION
Should creditors who are barred from enforcing claims against
a decedent's probate estate by nonclaim statutes gain "new life" if
bankruptcy proceedings supercede the principal probate adminis-
tration? The question seems simple, but there is no short answer.
In the first place, nonclaim statutes must be distinguished from
general statutes of limitation. The latter normally begin to run,
upon accrual of causes of action and reflect a general policy of
barring stale claims. Nonclaim statutes running from death of the
debtor, from the commencement of administration of his estate, or
from notice to creditors warning them that administration is under
way reflect a policy of prompt settlement of decedents' estates.
For creditors without knowledge of a debtor's death who do not
notice obscure legal notices possibly published in places that may
have little connection to their information about the debtor, the
operation of nonclaim statutes can be quite harsh.
Second, nonclaim statutes are notoriously short and appear to
be getting shorter as the probate establishment seeks ways of
expediting probate administrations. For example, Wisconsin now
bars creditors who do not present claims within three months
after a court order prescribing such limits. 77
Third, one must notice some circumstances that may operate
independently of the short time limits of nonclaim statutes to
create inequitable results for creditors. Creditors of decedents
may refrain from filing claims in probate where probate in-
ventories indicate that the estate available to claimants is quite
small. It is unclear whether such creditors should be barred from
participating in proceedings to recover fraudulently transferred
assets that are not considered as part of probate estates. Also,
nonclaim statutes in the several states vary in many important
particulars including starting point and length of time for non-
claim, 78 type of claims subject to nonclaim, 79 importance to non-
77WIs. STAT. ANN. § 859.05 (197 1).
78 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 204 (Supp. 1972) (upon issuance of letters-seven months);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §733.16 (Supp. 1972) (upon first publication of notice to creditors-six
months); CAL. PROB. CODE §707 (West Supp. 1972) (upon first publication of notice to
creditors-four months); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 197,§ 9 (Supp. 1972) (upon issuance of
letters and posting of bond-six months); N.Y. SURR. CT. PRO. § 1801 (McKinney
1967), § 1802 (McKinney Supp. 1972) (upon first publication of notice to creditors-three
months); id. § 1802 (upon issuance of letters, if no notice is published-seven months);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2117.06 (Supp. 1972) (upon issuance of letters-four months);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 859.05 (1971) (upon application for administration, the court by order
sets time-three months); UPC §§ 3-801, 3-803 (upon first publication of notice to credi-
tors-four months).
79Wls. STAT. ANN. § 859.01(3) (1971) (tort claims excluded); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2117.37-42, 2117.97 (1968) (contingent claims excluded).
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claim provisions of probate court findings and orders, 80 and rele-
vance of nonclaim provisions to assets not inventoried as part of
the probate estate. 81 This array of distinctions and procedures
probably contributes to an attitude of indifference to probate
machinery on the part of commercial creditors. Finally, the run-
ning of nonclaim provisions in one state usually does not bar
creditors from pursuing claims against portions of the same estate
that may be located in another state.
The bars created by probate nonclaim statutes should be ig-
nored when bankruptcy proceedings supercede probate adminis-
trations.
It may be argued that this position will create a powerful
inducement for creditors to seek bankruptcy takeover of estates
and create havoc in relation to the condition of inherited titles.
There are good answers to both points.
The principal answer to the first argument is that nonclaim
statutes rarely will have run before the expiration of the six
months from death suggested above as a limit on commencement
of bankruptcy proceedings. Nonclaim bars cannot operate under
the Uniform Probate Code until four months from the first adver-
tisement for claims have passed. 82 Advertisement cannot occur
until appointment and qualification of a personal representative,
which cannot occur until some time after death. 83 Hence, the
difference between the nonclaim time and six months from death
is not likely to be great. Further, nonclaim will not operate in the
minimum period under the UPC except as to creditors who have
not even taken the trouble to mail a bill to the personal represen-
tative or to the court.8 4 Perhaps these creditors will not have
learned of the debtor's death, but unsecured creditors who are so
lax in keeping track of their debtors as to be unaware of death for
more than four months after it occurs should not be the center of
legislative concern. Neither are they likely to wake up and dash
for bankruptcy court in the interval between nonclaim and six
months.
Further, the principal reason for bankruptcy of an estate will be
to create an administration that can consolidate probate and non-
probate assets as well as assets in several jurisdictions for equi-
80WIs. STAT. ANN. § 859.05 (1971) (court order required for commencement of non-
claim period); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 708.16 (1968) (time limited for payment of
claims is subject to court order).
81 Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.16 (Supp. 1972) (failure to file claim in time ex-
tinguishes the cause of action) with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 204 (Supp. 1972) (failure to
file only bars claim with respect to assets inventoried within nonclaim period).
82 U PC § 3-803.
Mid. § 3-103.
84 Id. § 3-804.
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table distribution to creditors. Probate nonclaim statutes which
may have run before bankruptcy frequently create bars relating
only to the assets inventoried in the local administration in ques-
tion.85 Practically speaking, nonclaim bars would be relatively
meaningless as to many assets coming into bankruptcy adminis-
tration even if state law were meticulously respected in bank-
ruptcy.
The proposed six-month limitation on commencement of bank-
ruptcy proceedings running from death provides an adequate an-
swer to the argument that nonclaim bars must be respected so that
the prospect of bankruptcy will not cloud or unsettle inherited
titles.
Another aspect of state law bearing on relative rights among
unsecured and nonpreferred creditors might be noted briefly. It
relates to two kinds of cases in which creditors may have different
rights to different portions of a decedent's estate. One involves
the relatively rare case in which creditors of a personal represen-
tative, whose claims are based on transactions incident to proper
continuation of the business, receive the priority of expenses of
administration in relation to the portion of the estate involved in
the business. 86 The other involves multistate estates where credi-
tors who have claims against the portion of an estate in one state
may be preferred as to such assets over creditors who filed their
claims elsewhere.8 7
The first case appears to be one in which the priority of the
business creditors should be respected. Presumably, the federal
law will respect the priority of expenses of previous adminis-
tration. If it does, business creditors of a probate representative
should not be jeopardized by bankruptcy. On the other hand, the
second case clearly is one where the bankruptcy administration
should ignore the varying rights of creditors to different parts of
the estate. This is implicit in the recommendation that state non-
claim statutes be ignored.
V. CLAIMS HAVING PRIORITY UNDER STATE LAW
AND OTHER CLAIM QUESTIONS
A typical state probate code gives priority in distribution of
assets to expenses of administration."8 These may include bills of
5 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 204 (Supp. 1972).
86 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 720.157 (1968).
87 Scoles, Conflict of Laws and Creditors' Rights in Decedents' Estates, 42 IOWA L.
Rev. 341, 354-56 (1957).
88See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 702.95 (1968).
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creditors for postmortem transactions with a personal represen-
tative who properly continues a business of the decedent. In-
variably, administration expenses will include compensation for
the personal representative, usually determined by reference to
statutory schedules establishing minimum amounts, and for attor-
neys employed by the personal representative as allowed by the
probate court. Bond premiums, appraisers' fees, filing and in-
ventory fees, publication costs, and other obvious expenses of a
personal representative also are included.
Reasonable funeral expenses as allowed by the probate court in
cases of insolvency typically have second priority even though
such expenses are often secured or guaranteed by contractual
obligations of survivors who may have made the arrangements
before appointment of a personal representative. Federal law puts
debts due the federal government ahead of all debts of the dece-
dent, including those that may have been owed to state govern-
ment.89 Bills incurred by the decedent as expenses of the last
illness typically come ahead of other debts due from the decedent
including possible obligations to the state.
Putting secured claims and family exemptions and priorities to
one side, it seems safe to assume that the only pressures for
special coverage of priorities in insolvent decedents' estates will
relate to costs of administration of prior probate administrations
and allowances for funerals.
A. Costs of Prior Probate Administration
Many, possibly most, insolvent decedents' estates will come to
the federal courts from prior probate administrations. This will be
the case becausefamilies will have first information about death in
most cases and commonly are enabled under state law to move
very quickly to obtain appointment of temporary or regular per-
sonal representatives. Under the Uniform Probate Code, routine
appointments may occur as soon as five days after death, and
procedures are provided for eliminating even this period of de-
lay9
Except where a prior probate administration has involved a
court order allowing fees for the personal representative or attor-
ney prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition, there is little
reason for burdening creditors in bankruptcy with state rates for
partially completed services. On the other hand, there is no rea-
son to deny compensation for services rendered to an estate prior
8931 U.S.C. § 191 (1970).
90 UPC §§ 3-301, 3-307(a).
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to the time it is taken over by bankruptcy. Control of the rates,
however, clearly should lie with the bankruptcy court.
Where payment of a fee to a temporary administrator, to his
attorney, or to appraisers has been approved by probate court
order, the bankruptcy administration should be bound only if
notice to creditors and opportunity to be heard were part of the
proceedings leading to the award. Historically, state probate pro-
ceedings have been known for frequency of court orders, many
resting on dubious assumptions regarding the need for notice in in
rem proceedings. The public would be well served by federal
legislation that creates new opportunities for creditors of insolvent
decedents to exert pressure against probate court orders of
dubious validity that have long appeared to seal off opportunities
to raise questions about fees.
B. Funeral Allowances
The nation's funeral industry probably would offer strong pro-
tests against federal bankruptcy legislation that threatened the
time-honored assumption that reasonable funeral costs are en-
titled to priority over dividends to unsecured creditors. The
present statute does not give any special recognition to funeral
expenses of a debtor who dies after bankruptcy proceedings have
been commenced. Nevertheless, undertakers are able to protect
themselves from losses in relation to funerals for known bank-
rupts in ways that would not occur to them in connection with
decedents having known estates and unknown debts that later
resulted in bankruptcy.
It would be appropriate to give reasonable funeral expenses
priority in distribution of insolvent decedents' estates. There is,
however, no reason to change present law in relation to funeral
expenses for debtors who die after proceedings are commenced.
The determination of reasonableness should be left to local refer-
ees. Bankruptcy court review and redetermination of funeral ex-
penses previously allowed by probate court order should be per-
mitted unless creditors were given notice and an opportunity to
contest the allowance.
C. Administration of Claims
Because state standards regarding proof of claims will differ
from bankruptcy standards, creditors probably should be required
to reprove claims when bankruptcy proceedings are commenced.
It may be possible, however, to give referees discretion to accept
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claims which have been previously filed with a probate represen-
tative. Claims that have been paid in a previous state adminis-
tration should be subject to recovery in all cases where they are
not protected by a prior court order following notice to creditors
and an opportunity to be heard. This net may catch many small
merchant creditors who normally succeed in getting premature
payment of small claims from family members serving as personal
representatives. Because the turmoil of recovery of small pay-
ments may be more costly than the gain for other creditors, and
because it would be unfortunate if the cloud of possible bank-
ruptcy were to lead cautious fiduciaries in apparently solvent
estates to delay payment of small claims, the bankruptcy law
should be framed so as to permit creditors who received payment
of claims of less than $ 100 from a prior probate fiduciary to keep
their payments. The suggestion would be more palatable to many
if it were qualified to protect payments made by a personal repre-
sentative who was unaware that the estate was insolvent when the
small bills were paid.
There is little persuasive basis for respecting more significant
payments to claimants by a prior probate representative that may
have occurred before institution of bankruptcy, unless the prin-
ciples of res judicata apply. Nor is there any reason to approach
the question of recovery of these payments from the viewpoint of
the present statute's cumbersome definition of voidable prefer-
ences. 91 Probate representatives should represent all creditors,
and should be put under the pressures of federal and state law to
ascertain with some care the probable solvency of estates before
making payments to creditors. The hypothetical possibility of
bankruptcy probably will not deter risk-taking settlements of
clearly solvent estates or small estates. This also means that there
will be some hard cases. Nevertheless, standards of the Uniform
Probate Code clearly subject personal representatives and claim-
ants receiving payment from them to risks of personal liability to
estates if payments jeopardize the right of all creditors to prorata
participation in assets available for claims. Federal law should be
to the same effect.
VI. OTHER FEDERAL USE OF STATE LAW
Once bankruptcy proceedings have been commenced, there is
no compelling reason for revitalizing any state probate proceed-
ings that may have been superceded. State law and functions
normally performed by state courts may need to be applied and
91 I I U.S.C. § 96(a) (1970).
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performed by federal authorities, but this presents no in-
surmountable problem provided the legislation makes it clear that
the bankruptcy tribunal or agency is to exercise powers of a state
probate court where necessary to carry out the purposes of the
legislation. Saying this assumes that the federal statute will contin-
ue to permit a bankruptcy trustee to initiate state court proceed-
ings when a matter requires determination of an unresolved point
of state law.
One area where the federal authority will need to apply state
law and exercise authority normally handled by the local probate
court relates to dower and family allowances. Although the Uni-
form Probate Code eliminates dower and the need for court
participation in determination of family allowances, extant law in
many states puts the probate court in the middle of these proce-
dures.
Many state codes require probate court orders to confirm titles
or distribute assets representing inheritances. Occasionally, a
bankruptcy administration for a decedent's estate may leave a
residue for distribution to inheritors. There appears to be no
obstacle to the federal court's performing the role of the probate
court in distributing surplus assets.
A theoretical difficulty may attend distribution of a multistate
estate involving land in two or more states. The situation is that in
which inheritance rights traditionally are determined by the laws
of the places where the land of the decedent was owned at death.
The Uniform Probate Code, if uniformly enacted, would prac-
tically eliminate the problem by coercing uniform application of
the law of the decedent's domicile in cases involving wills. In
intestacies, however, the law of the situs of land would still
determine heirs, and if the inheritors are the spouse and children,
their shares may be affected by the fact that several states are
involved.
In view of the possible relevance of different rules of in-
heritance for different parts of an estate, the federal statute should
direct the trustee or the federal tribunal to distribute surplus in
accordance with applicable state law.
VII. TITLE OF THE TRUSTEE OF AN INSOLVENT ESTATE
A. Background-Abatement ofAction by
Death
Death of an obligor abates actions pending against him. All but
suits on personal liabilities that do not survive may, however, be
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revived against his personal representative. 92 Liens obtained by
attachments prior to death may be preserved through revived
actions against the personal representative. Where no attachment
lien has been obtained before death, judgments frequently may be
obtained against personal representatives even though procedures
for presentment of claims in probate are not observed. Never-
theless, state statutes usually make it clear that no liens can be
obtained after death, for then the probate process governs the
marshaling of assets. 93
B. Background-Assets Available to Claimants
1. Primary Probate Estate-This subdivision relates to proper-
ty standing in the decedent's name at the time of his death that is
unaffected by rights of survivorship or future interests in others
which become possessory at his death. This property can be
called the primary probate estate even though it may embrace
land which may become available for payment of claims only after
personal assets have been exhausted.
There are wide variations in state laws regarding the title and
power of a personal representative to assets constituting the
primary probate estate. For example, in many states, title and the
right to possess personal estate of a decedent vests in the personal
representative upon his appointment and qualification, while title
to real estate descends to heirs or devisees, subject to being
sequestered in land-sale proceedings where necessary to meet
debts and expenses. 94 In Wisconsin, title to real and personal
property vests in the personal representative,9 5 while in Califor-
nia, title to both classes of property passes to devisees or heirs
subject to administration and a statutory duty on the personal
representative to possess the entire estate0 6 In many states, title
to land and personalty still follow their divergent common-law
paths, but the personal representative's right to possess and ad-
minister the estate relates to both classes of property without
important differences? 7 Also, state laws vary markedly in relation
92T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 693 (2d ed. 1953); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 54 (1968); CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 385 (West Supp. 1972); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 228, § 4 (1955); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2311.21 (Supp. 1972); WIs. STAT.
ANN. §§ 269.16 (1957), 859.03 (1971).
93 2 J. WOERNER, supra note 29, at § 410.94 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2127.01 et seq. (1968); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 202,§ I et
seq.(1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 225-252 (Supp. 1972).
95 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 857.01, .27 (1971).
96CAL. PROB. CODE § 300 (West 1956).
97 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 707.1 (1968).
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to the ability of probate fiduciaries to sell, lease, exchange, or
otherwise administer assets of the estate? 8 Typically, different
powers relate to personal and real assets, and there is also vari-
ance in the degree to which probate court orders approving or
confirming sales are necessary. The terms of the decedent's will
are frequently important in this regard.
2. Powers of Revocation and Appointment- Rights of credit-
ors, either acting directly or through the representation of a per-
sonal representative, to reach assets outside those constituting the
primary probate estate are found in various legal compartments.
Rules governing fraudulent transfers and the law of future in-
terests normally determine rights of creditors to property in which
the decedent held an unexercised power of revocation or appoint-
ment at his death. Under common-law decisions, gift transfers in
which the decedent reserved a life estate and a power of revoca-
tion can be reached by personal representatives when normal
probate assets were insufficient to meet all claims.99 On the other
hand, representatives of decedents who held donated general
powers of appointment frequently cannot reach the property sub-
ject to the power unless the decedent exercised the power in favor
of volunteers. 100 In some states, however, the technical line be-
tween powers and property is observed notwithstanding the ex-
ercise of a general power, 01 and in Maryland not even appoint-
ment to the estate of the donee of a power aids his creditors. 10 2
The trend in newer state statutes, like those in effect in Michigan
and California, is to treat every general power held by a decedent
at the time of his death as an asset available to creditors when
normal probate assets are insufficient.10 3 Nevertheless, even
though the substantive authority of personal representatives un-
der these statutes is clear, it still may be useful for them to obtain
probate court orders determining insolvency and authorizing suit
against whoever has the property subject to the decedent's power.
Also, these statutes would not give creditors much assistance in
cases where the decedent had exercised or released a general
9 8 Compare CAL. PROB. CODE § 755 (West Supp. 1972) (With few exceptions "all sales
of property must be reported to... and confirmed by the court before title of property
passes .... ) with UPC §§ 3-711, 3-7 15(23) (personal representative has title to the dece-
dent's property and broad powers of sale).
99 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.18 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
100 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 330 (1940); 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.17
(A. Casner ed. 1952).
10 ISee St. Matthews Bank v. De Charette, 259 Ky. 802, 8.3 S.W.2d 471 (1935);
Johnson v. Shriver, 121 Colo. 397, 216 P.2d 653 (1950).
102 Frank v. Frank, 253 Md. 413, 253 A.2d 377 (1969).
103 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1390.1-.4 (Supp. 1972); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 556.123
(Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 702.17 (Supp. 1972).
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power prior to death, thereby forcing collectors to rely on general
rules governing fraudulent transfers.
3. Interest of Debtor in Joint Tenancies-Conceivably, the
ability of a joint tenant to transform his relationship with fellow
joint tenants into a tenancy in common without right of survivor-
ship is a form of power of appointment. If it is a power, then
modern statutes on powers of appointment might make the con-
trol over his fractional interest, as of the moment before death, a
basis for subjecting the interest in the hands of the survivors to
the creditors in the event the primary probate estate is insufficient.
Yet the ability of a joint tenant to sever the tenacy traditionally
has not been considered to be a power of appointment and, even if
it were so classified, it would be of little help to creditors in states
where general powers must be exercised in order to make proper-
ty available to creditors of the donee. Hence it is quite unlikely
that lapse of this ability upon death would be equated with the
making of a gift at death for purposes of creditors' rights. If the
joint tenancy arose from a donation by the decedent-debtor to the
other joint tenants, the transaction might be vulnerable as a
fraudulent conveyance; but the traditional theory of this relation-
ship makes the survivor's rights to his portion and the decedent's
retained portion date from the creation of the tenancy.10 4 Hence,
the tests for fraudulent transfers normally must be met as of the
time when the joint tenancy was established.
4. Interests of Debtor in Other Will Substitutes-According to
the Second Restatement of Trusts, the interest of one who estab-
lishes a bank account in his name as "trustee" for another, where
there is no other evidence of intention to make an irrevocable
donation, is subject to the claims of his creditors if his estate is
insufficient to cover claims. 10 5 Under this view, the trustee in
bankruptcy of the estate of the settlor of one of these "tentative
trusts," would be able to reach account balances as of death if he
has the rights of an unpaid creditor. Other forms of multiple-party
accounts include accounts that are payable to the debtor while
alive and to another in the event of death, and accounts payable to
two or more and to the survivor.' 0 6 The rights of creditors of
insolvent decedents who established these forms of accounts are
10 4 See Hayes v. Schaefer, 399 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1968) (denying bankrupt one-half of
proceeds of entireties property when bankrupt's spouse died eight months after com-
mencement of bankruptcy, court applied the common law view that the rights of the
survivor of such a tenancy date back to the creation of the estate).
105 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TRUSTS § 58, Comment (d) (1959); G. PALMER, TRUSTS
AND SUCCESSION 346-47 (1968).
06 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1107.08, 2131.10-.11 (1968) (provisions fail to
mention rights of creditors of depositor in the account upon his death).
[VOL. 6:552
Insolvent Decedents' Estates
uncertain under present state law. In many states, the assumption
would be that the survivor's rights accrued as of the time when
the account was established and that lapse of the decedent's
power to withdraw during his lifetime would not be an event that
creditors could treat as a transfer occurring at death.
Under Section 6-107 of the Uniform Probate Code, a personal
representative who has received a written demand from an unpaid
creditor or a beneficiary of family exemptions who has not re-
ceived full satisfaction, may proceed against surviving ben-
eficiaries of deposit accounts serving as will substitutes for bal-
ances at death. This provision of the Code resembles and extends
rules recognized in New York'01 7 and by Second Restatement of
Trusts relating to accounts in the name of a decedent as trustee
for another where there is no other evidence of an inter vivos
trust. 0
5. Creditors' Remedies Against Fraudulent Transfers-
Personal representatives have varying relationships to transfers
by a decedent which are voidable by creditors for reasons other
than the character of interests retained by the debtor at his death.
Section 3-710 of the UPC, following Section 125 of the Model
Probate Code and state legislation in a few states, places the
exclusive right to recover fraudulent transfers in the personal
representative, "so far as necessary for the payment of debts of
the decedent." In states without explicit legislation on the point,
the authority of a personal representative is less clear.10 9
C. Title of Trustee of
Insolvent Estates-Recommendations
1. In General-Presumably, a trustee for an insolvent dece-
dent's estate will acquire the title and power over the decedent's
assets that are, under applicable state law, available to the probate
court and personal representative incident to administration of the
decedent's estate. Also, the trustee should get the power of a
creditor of the estate, whose claim has been duly proved and
allowed but is unpaid because of insufficiency of assets in the
probate estate, to set aside or otherwise to enforce a right created
107 N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 134(2), 171(2), 239(2), (5) (McKinney 1971). See also N.Y.
JUR. Trusts§ 110(1968).Cf. UPC§§6-101 to6-113.
'
08 See note 105 supra.
109 Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 859.40-.41 (1971) (although not expressly authorized
to sue, a personal representative apparently has authority to bring suit) with Kent v. Lyon,
4 Fla. 474, 56 Am. Dec. 404 (1852) (a personal representative lacks power to impeach
transfers by his decedent).
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by federal or state law to payment from assets in the hands of
donees of the decedent which are subject to recovery on behalf of
creditors in cases of insolvency.
Finally, the trustee who is appointed to succeed a probate
representative should receive all powers given by law or possible
through probate court order for a successor personal representa-
tive. The purpose of this addition is to ensure that a trustee in
bankruptcy will have the ability to pursue prior representatives of
the estate or their bondsmen to recover sums lost through defalca-
tion or actionable neglect.
2. Problems Relating to 70a(3) and 70a(5) Rights-This array
would leave the trustee short in at least two important respects of
having title and authority presently available to trustees of living
debtors. These relate to items within Subsection 70a(5) 110 and
powers available to the trustee under Subsection 70a(3).11 The
problem relating to the application of both of these provisions to
insolvent decedents' estates is that the debtor's death will have
ended his powers of appointment, his ability to sever joint te-
nancies, and possibly his right relating to various other relation-
ships. One example of the latter would be the right, usually
personal, of a surviving spouse to reject the provisions of the will
of the other spouse and to receive a capital share of his estate as
measured by various kinds of statutes preventing disinheritance of
a spouse.
The inability of a trustee of an insolvent decedent to reach any
interest of the decedent in property held in joint tenancy with
another who survived would constitute a serious qualification on
the effort to design federal remedies for creditors of insolvent
decedents' estates that will eliminate the disparity that now exists
where a debtor's death precedes insolvency proceedings. The
California statistics described earlier indicate the extent to which
joint tenancies were used in 1965 to avoid probate.11 2 The extent
is probably higher now because the last several years have been
marked by an increase in public criticisms of probate procedures
and, in all likelihood, an increase in use of probate avoidance
devices like joint tenancies. Joint tenancies do not embarass bank-
ruptcy proceedings against living debtors, because Subsection
70a(5) gives the trustee the undivided interest that a debtor who is
a joint tenant might have transferred to another."13 Death, how-
1to 11 U.S.C. § I 10(a)(5) (1970).
... Id. § I 10(a)(3).
112 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
113 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.17(10) (J. Moore ed. 1972).
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ever, ends the ability of a joint tenant or his creditors to sever his
interest.
Similarly, death before exercise frequently results in lapse of
powers of appointment that might have been exercised by a per-
son for his own benefit. State law concerning the rights of credit-
ors of persons holding powers to revoke gifts or to appoint trust
or other estates to themselves under powers created by others is
not a satisfactory substitute for Subsection 70a(3) of the present
bankruptcy statute. Transfers from which a donor retains a life
estate and a power of revocation are commonly insufficient to
remove assets from the reach of the transferor's creditors, and
local power of appointment or fraudulent transfer law may make
assets so transferred available to creditors of the transferor's
estate. Where, however, a mere power to revoke is retained, or
where the decedent's general power of appointment was created
by a gift from another, creditors' rights under state laws are in
disarray. The trend of modern statutes is to equate powers ex-
ercisable in favor of a donee with property owned by the
donee,114 but the common-law rule, which made creditors' rights
depend on whether the donee had exercised the power, still has
wide acceptance. Also, in a substantial number of states, property
passing by virtue of exercise of a general power of appointment is
deemed to have been given to the appointee by the donor, so that
creditors of the donee are without a remedy. 11 5
In passing, it should be noted that creditors' remedies against
fraudulent transfers will be of no avail to creditors of persons who
held general powers of appointment created by others. Hence, the
policy of Subsection 70a(3) must be extended to a proceeding
instituted against the estate of one whose death caused the lapse
of a general power, if bankruptcy proceedings against estates are
to be framed to avoid the impact of death on creditors' rights.
3. Recommendation to Prevent Loss of 70a(3) and 70a(5)
Rights in Insolvent Decedents' Estates-No sufficient reason ap-
pears why property that a debtor might have made his own as of a
moment before his death, and so a part of his estate, should not be
included in his estate for bankruptcy purposes. Technical tests of
title, rather than substantive ability to control wealth, have been
iccepted by state law to determine the extent of probate estates.
This approach reflects the public's strong antipathy for mandatory
procedures that serve to place every probate estate in court even
"
4 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1390.1-.4 (Supp. 1972); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 556.123
(Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 702.17 (Supp. 1972).
15 See notes 100-03 and accompanying text supra.
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though no creditors or heirs desire the proceeding. Some local
developments recognize that creditors should have rights in some
probate-avoiding transfers, but the trend is weak because credit-
ors are on the outside of the typical circle that controls local
probate and property law. 116 Further, creditors have placed prin-
cipal reliance on bankruptcy rules and these rules now should
afford some offset to state patterns relating to decedents' estates
that are hostile to the interest of unsecured creditors.
The question remains as to how to shape bankruptcy law appli-
cable to estates so as to prevent loss of 70a(3) and 70a(5) rights.
Arguably, the title of a trustee for an insolvent decedent's estate
should be related back to a moment before the decedent's death,
rather than be timed to coincide with the filing of the petition.
Because death freezes a decedent's property rights and because
provisions normally applicable when a bankruptcy proceeding
supercedes a state insolvency proceeding would protect rights
based on acts of a probate representative who functioned before
bankruptcy, there appear to be no insurmountable problems in
relating the Section 70 rights of a trustee back to the moment
preceding death. It is true that if insolvency did not exist at the
time of death, but developed because of loss of asset value after
death, the relation-back idea appears to jeopardize the interests of
persons holding nonprobate assets who were not recipients of a
fraudulent transfer or of property that was entwined with the
estate that declined in value after death. Nevertheless, it can be
argued that fault should be assigned to decedents who fail to
exercise powers available to them so as to provide financing
adequate to protect unsecured creditors of their estates against
postmortem losses. If this is accepted, no inequity would attend
recovery from persons who become donees because of the dece-
dent's failure to exercise his powers.
It would not be necessary to say that the petition must be
deemed to be filed as of a moment before the decedent's death in
order to reach the goal that must be reached. Elsewhere in this
article,117 it is argued that persons who may have received prefer-
ential transfers or liens within four months before death should
not be given the benefit of time running after death and before the
filing of a bankruptcy petition. This is a separate point, however,
which can be accepted or rejected without regard to whether a
"1
6 See discussion in Wellman, Law Teachers and The Uniform Probate Code, 24 J.
LEGAL EDUCATION 180, 183-84 (1972), of the process in New York leading to estate and
probate law studies and changes.
117 See text accompanying notes 122-24 infra,
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trustee's title under Section 70 can be related to the moment
before death in cases where the proceeding involves an insolvent
decedent's estate.
There are other ways of accomplishing some of the purposes
that would be served by the relation-back idea, but none seem as
adequate. For example, federal law might include a test of transfer
keyed to the time when the transferor ceased to have the ability to
recall the property for his own use. Transfers as of this moment
would stand or fall depending on whether other elements that
would make an absolute transfer voidable at the instance of cred-
itors were present. Under this test, one-half of joint tenancies
created by a debtor would be recoverable for his creditors if the
transferor proved to be insolvent at the moment of death. Other
forms of revocable transfers also could be reached under state
standards for fraudulent transfers. Nevertheless, this approach
has drawbacks. First, it assumes a complex mix of federal law and
state law elements vis-h-vis the identification of certain void-
able transfers that might be impractical. Second, it would not
help creditors of a joint tenancy that had been created by some-
one other than the debtor, and it would not help creditors who
sought to reach property subject to a donated general power held
by a debtor at his death. Finally, it would not help in a variety of
cases that could not be classified as involving an incomplete or
fraudulent transfer, but which involve an ability on the part of a
deceased to make assets available to himself and his estate.
4. Problem and Recommendation Relating to Tenancies by
the Entireties-If tenancies by the entireties were merely sev-
ered by the bankruptcy of one of the parties, the trustee of the
estate in bankruptcy of a living debtor would obtain the debtor's
interest in one-half for life, and his interest in the whole if he
survives the other. The right of the other tenant to take the entire
estate in the event he proves to be the survivor would not be
affected. Yet this position would not assist creditors of a tenant
by the entireties who died leaving an insolvent estate. If bank-
ruptcy of a tenant by the entireties transforms the estate into a
tenancy in common, creditors of a deceased tenant would receive
adequate protection from the proposal to relate a bankruptcy
trustee's title to a moment before death. In any event, treatment
of entireties property should be the same in cases involving living
debtors and insolvent decedents.
5. Transfers -by Debtor with Retained Life Estate- Federal
and state estate tax statutes treat gift transfers by one who retains
a life estate in the transferred property as transfers at death for
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tax purposes." 81 Present bankruptcy rules do not take any special
account of retained life estates unless state law characterizes the
transaction giving rise to them as fraudulent."19 If a power to
revoke is also retained, the bankruptcy statute permits creditors
to avoid the transaction.' 20 In irrevocable transfers, the value of a
retained life estate is subject to creditors' claims. One who re-
tained an interest conditioned to shift to another in the event of
bankruptcy presumably would be held to have made a fraudulent
transfer. Clearly, efforts to impose direct restraints on the alien-
ability of retained interests would be ineffective.1 2 1 Overall, there-
fore, there is little inducement to persons who may worry about
bankruptcy at some future date to enter into gift transfers with
retained life interests.
Arguably, the situation is somewhat different when death with-
out sufficient assets to meet debts is conceived to be an occasion
for bankruptcy. A debtor who might plan suicide in the event of
bankruptcy might find advantage in reducing his titles to life
estates so that his spouse or children could assert remainder
interests against his estate and his creditors.
Unless concealed, however, titles to irrevocable successive
estates mean loss of management ability. If management powers
are retained, as might be accomplished through use of a
self-declared trust, state courts could invalidate the transaction at
the suit of creditors on grounds of fraud. The same result might
follow where an owner attempts to turn himself into a managing
trustee for his family without reserving any explicit, beneficial
interest for himself. Accordingly, there is little reason for recom-
mending any new bankruptcy standards on the subject of retained
life estates.
Some thought might be given, however, to a special bankruptcy
rule regarding powers of rescission, revocation, or appointment,
exercisable in favor of a debtor-decedent with the concurrence of
another person who is a trustee of a trust created by the debtor or
a member of the debtor's household. These powers might be
equated with general powers of appointment exercisable solely
by the decedent-debtor for bankruptcy purposes. The rule should
be applied only to powers over property which were created in a
transfer or other transaction attributable to consideration moving
from the debtor. The objective of the rule would be to give
creditors access to property which, in view of practical consid-
1
1 8 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2036. See, e.g., OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. § 5731.06
(Supp. 1972).
119 See II U.S.C. § i 10(e)(I) (1970).
121 See id. § I l0(a)(3).
121 Ware v. Gulda, 331 Mass. 68, 117 N.E.2d 137 (1954).
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erations operating among closely related persons or as between
settlor and trustee, is commonly available to a debtor for payment
of debts if he chooses to make it so.
Like any new federal rule regarding tenancies by the entireties,
however, the suggestion should be made applicable to living debt-
ors as well as to decedents who left insolvent estates. Also, it
should be made applicable only to transactions occurring after the
effective date of a new bankruptcy act.
6. Life Insurance-Opening bankruptcy proceedings to dece-
dents' estates may be the occasion for new interest in the impact
of bankruptcy of an insured on his life policies. It is believed,
however, that it should not be the occasion for significant changes
in the present rules determining the relationship of bankruptcy to
life insurance on the debtor's life. New rules relating to bankrupt
estates may encounter difficulty in the political arena merely be-
cause they will reflect a new incursion of federal law on state
procedures. Any attempt to change the rules relating to creditors'
rights to life insurance would involve disregard for state ex-
emptions for insurance and would involve complex extensions to
a variety of contracts involving creditor beneficiary insurance, and
insurance serving as inducements for accounts in credit unions
and other savings arrangements. If the life insurance industry is
moved to oppose the new development the chances of realizing
any progress would become slim indeed.
Hence, premiums paid by a debtor for life insurance shortly
before bankruptcy might be recoverable only if state rules for
fraudulent transfers so dictate and if the values acquired are not
otherwise exempt. Death benefits received by creditor ben-
eficiaries should not constitute preferences to any greater extent
than that attributable to consideration paid by the debtor during
the four months preceding death. Other death benefits should
constitute assets for creditors only if they would be subject to
creditors' claims under state law.
VIII. LIENS AND PREFERENCES ACQUIRED WITHIN
FOUR MONTHS OF DEATH
Arguably, the date of the decedent's death rather than the date
of the bankruptcy petition should be used as the point of time
from which to measure periods within which preferences can
be avoided. 122 Preferred creditors may assert that the debtor's
death should not toll the running of a period that may protect
122 Cf. I I U.S.C. § 96(a) (1970).
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them. Nevertheless the death of a prospective defendant in-
evitably confuses and delays the institution of proceedings
against him. It would be unfair to other creditors to give preferred
creditors the advantage of this hiatus. Hence, the analogy to
general statutes of limitation which are regularly tolled by death is
appropriate. 123 Further, an idea that the magic, four-month period
should resume running after, say, sixty days from death or upon
appointment of a personal representative, is not acceptable be-
cause creditors may be lulled into inaction as they await perform-
ance by the personal representative. It follows that creditors who
gained voluntary or involuntary preferences within four months
before death would not be secure with their payments or liens
until the period of limitations on filing of bankruptcy petitions for
insolvent estates has run.
As indicated earlier, 124 this suggestion is separate from the
suggestion that title of a bankruptcy trustee for an insolvent
decedent under Section 70 should be related to the decedent's
affairs as of a moment before death. It is also less important
because preferences will probably not be very important in rela-
tion to insolvent decedents' estates. This guess work is based on a
belief that persons contemplating death are more likely to make
probate-avoiding gifts to their families than they are to make
preferential payments to creditors. Nevertheless, persons become
decedents without planning for the event. Hence, preferences
should not be ignored.
IX. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The application of federal bankruptcy law is necessary to pro-
tect creditors from the vagaries of local law as complicated by the
increasing tendency of individuals to arrange for transfers at death
via nonprobate means. The recommended extension requires
some significant adjustments to the present Bankruptcy Act.
First, bankruptcy proceedings for insolvent decedents' estates
should be restricted to minimize the risk that probate proceedings
routinely will be superceded by federal proceedings and to en-
courage improvement of local law. Second, although state law
would determine the existence and beneficiaries of exemptions
given to the surviving spouse and children, federal law should
123 CAL. PROB. CODE §353 (West 1956); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 734.28 (Supp. 1972); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 20 (Supp. 1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 10 (1968); N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. §210(b)(1972);Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.34 (1966); UPC § 3-802.
124 See part V II C 3 supra.
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establish ceilings on the amounts that will be allowed as ex-
emptions. Third, local nonclaim provisions should be disregarded
in bankruptcy, but bankruptcy proceedings for estates should be
subject to a short period of limitations running from death to keep
the risk of bankruptcy from unduly prolonging estate settlement.
Fourth, federal law should give reasonable funeral expenses the
same priority as other expenses of administration. Fifth, where
necessary, the bankruptcy court should exercise the powers of a
state probate court in relation to an insolvent decedent's estate.
Sixth, to give the trustee for an insolvent decedent's estate sub-
stantially the same title and rights as the trustee for the bank-
ruptcy estate of a living debtor, the title of the former should be
related back to a moment before death. Finally, the rights of a
trustee of an insolvent decedent's estate under Sections 60 and 67
should be measured by a period of four months before death
rather than four months prior to the filing of the petition.
This is an especially opportune time for extension of bank-
ruptcy to insolvent decedents' estates. Even if it were to be
generally adopted by the states, the Uniform Probate Code would
not provide the complete relief that creditors would receive
through an extention of bankruptcy law. Like the state codes from
which it is derived, the UPC is keyed to the usual decedent's
estate where creditors' claims are a minor concern. But, the Code
is spreading the concept that a probate fiduciary is a statutory
trustee who represents a quasi-entity. This concept should lower
conceptual barriers that may have deterred earlier efforts to ex-
tend bankruptcy to its logical limits. Also, the realization that this
new "ideal" state law leaves creditors without the protections that
have come to be taken for granted in insolvency cases should ease
the process of rounding out the bankruptcy remedy, As suggested
by the foregoing discussion, the process will involve some prob-
lems, but none that seem beyond the reach of relatively simple
resolution.
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